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Juror Journalism: Are Profit Motives
Replacing Civic Duty?
I. INTRODUCTION
The attempted assassination of President Reagan by John Hinckley
and the ensuing trial captured the attention of the American public
as well as the media. When the jury in the Hinckley trial announced
its verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the media displayed an
obsessive interest in ascertaining the reason for the verdict.1 Because
of the intense curiosity with this and other highly publicized criminal
trials, jurors are increasingly exposed to overwhelming public and
media attention. Now, with juries in the spotlight, it seems jurors are
reaping more than just fame and notoriety.
Enticed by the opportunity of receiving significant financial gain,
many jurors in high profile trials are becoming more than just fact-
finders-they are becoming journalists as well.2 Widespread interest
in such cases often places the content of the jurors' deliberations in
great demand. In fact, two jurors in the widely publicized Bernhard
Goetz trial sold their personal accounts of the trial to New York tab-
loids for handsome sums. 3
This so called "juror journalism" raises serious legal concerns.
Some commentators urge that it threatens the very integrity of the
jury system. 4 By documenting personal accounts of their jury experi-
ence and then selling them to the press, these juror journalists may
be changing the way jury service has been viewed over the past sev-
1. As many of the jurors returned home from the Hinckley trial, they found re-
porters and TV crews anxiously awaiting them for interviews and comments. One ju-
ror even exclaimed, "I did just about every radio show there is. I didn't know there
were so many of them." Beach, The Juror as Celebrity: Does Post-verdict Press Scru-
tiny Prevent Abuses or Create Them?, TIME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 41.
2. During the recent Howard Beach murder trial in New York, one of the jurors
sought to sell her diary to the highest bidding newspaper. Chambers, Little Room on
Juries for Profit Motive, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 13, col. 4. Similarly, one juror in
the Westmoreland libel suit against CBS was paid $15,000 for her book about the trial
and a juror in the Pennzoil-Texaco case is just finishing a book soon to be published by
Prentice-Hall. Jost, The Dawn of Big-Bucks Juror Journalism, Legal Times, July 20,
1987, at 15, col. 1.
3. The New York Daily News and the New York Post reportedly offered the two
jurors roughly $2,500 and $7,500 respectively for their stories. Jost, supra note 2, at 15,
col. 2.
4. Id. at 16, col. 4.
eral decades.5 If allowed to continue unchecked, juror journalism
could conceivably result in prospective veniremen actively endeavor-
ing to gain seats in high publicity cases solely to procure a financial
windfall. This sort of conduct counters the very nature of jury ser-
vice, which has been described as a civic duty.6 Further, the possibil-
ity exists that a juror may take actions during the deliberations to
produce a more dramatic verdict, rather than responding to the evi-
dence presented. Perhaps more importantly, the fear of publicized
deliberations could inhibit jurors from speaking freely in the jury
room. Thus, as juror journalism becomes increasingly prevalent, the
courts and the legislature will likely be called upon to take action to
alleviate these problems.7
The purpose of this comment is to examine these concerns and
evaluate the conflicts that juror journalism has produced. To provide
an adequate framework for addressing these troubling issues, this
comment will explore the history and evolution of the jury system in
the United States and then focus on the juror's right to publicly dis-
close personal accounts of trial proceedings. This right will be con-
trasted with the rights of the defendant and those of other jurors
which may be affected by the disclosure of trial proceedings for a
profit. Finally, policy considerations encompassing the duty of the
courts along with the need to preserve secrecy in the deliberation
process will be analyzed to determine the adverse effect, if any, that
juror journalism may invoke in these important areas.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JURY
A. The Early Jury System
The roots of our modern jury system may be traced back to the
Anglo-Saxons.8 Prior to the invasion of William the Conqueror, a
trial was initiated by a hearing before the king's officers and men of
prominence in the community.9 The right of trial by jury as we
know it today was nonexistent and trial by ordeal was the common
mode of the day for persons accused of criminal wrongdoing.1o This
5. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
6. See inkfra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
7. Jost, supra note 2, at 16, col. 4.
8. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23 (1986). See generally J. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1979); W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF
TRIAL BY JURY (2d ed. 1971); and 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW (2d ed. 1968) for a thorough discussion of the evolution of the modern jury
system.
9. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 23.
10. Trial by ordeal often took many varied forms and was generally instituted if
the accused had been previously judged guilty of perjury or was of suspicious charac-
ter. B. LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 101-02
(2d ed. 1980). See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 598. This archaic
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type of trial required the accused to endure various forms of physical
torture.ll God was considered to be the supreme judge, and the peo-
ple believed that by using this method of trial, God would intercede if
the accused was innocent.12 Thus, if the person survived the ordeal,
he was then declared innocent.
Sometime during the thirteenth century, enlightened thinkers be-
gan to realize that trial by ordeal was not a reliable system of render-
ing justice, and the church began to ban the practice.' 3 Eventually,
an individual accused of criminal misconduct was allowed a choice
between trial by ordeal or trial by jury.' 4 Given the alternatives, it is
easy to see why the preferred choice was trial by jury, or judicium
parium.1
5
When the early colonists left England for America, they naturally
brought with them many of their customs and governing systems in-
cluding the notion of a right to a jury trial.16 Thus, when the English
government restricted that right, the colonists vehemently voiced
their disapproval.17 In fact, many of the founding fathers believed
that the maintenance of individual liberty was predicated upon the
right to trial by jury.'8 In the eyes of the colonists, juries were a
political force that could guard the rights and wisdom of the commu-
method of trial probably originated in Biblical times. See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON
TRIAL 26 (1984); L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 29
(1973).
11. One type of ordeal involved the carrying of a hot iron by hand. After the
ordeal, the person's hand would be bandaged and examined a few days later. Guilt or
innocence depended upon whether the hand became infected. B. LYON, supra note 10,
at 102; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 598.
12. J. LAUGHLIN, The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, in ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON
LAW 300-01 (1972).
13. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 26; L. MOORE, supra note 10, at 35-45; 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 599.
14. P. DIPERNA, supra note 10, at 26; V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 26.
15. This is an Old English phrase meaning judgment of one's peers, or more sim-
ply, trial by jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (5th ed. 1979).
16. See R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 406 (1978).
17. Two specific acts were passed by the English Parliament that seriously
threatened the right to trial by jury. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 16, at 281.
The Stamp Act placed taxes on a variety of items including legal documents and col-
lege degrees. Violations of the Act were enforced in admiralty courts operating with-
out juries. Id. at 263. The Massachusetts Government Act overruled the common
practice of juror selection by town meeting in allowing sheriffs to make the selections.
Id. at 282. See also 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
196-97 (1971) (indicating that colonists believed trial by jury was their inherent and in-
valuable right).
18. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 36.
nity against any governmental abuse of authority.19
This strong feeling regarding the right to trial by jury was also
brought to the Constitutional Convention. The founders took steps
to ensure that the oppressions suffered at the hands of the English
king would not recur in America.20 As a result, the right to trial by
jury was included in the Bill of Rights in both the sixth and seventh
amendments. 21
B. The Civic Duty
An essential aspect of the jury system is that juries be composed of
common citizens from every walk of life within the same community
as the accused. 22 ' In order for this system to function properly, an in-
herent obligation attached to jury service is necessary.23 As with
many other rights, the right to be judged by a jury imposes on every
citizen the responsibility to take an active part in this system.24 Con-
sequently, jury service has come to be known as jury duty.
Some courts have long recognized the common law duty to serve
on juries, 25 an obligation which has now been codified by federal and
19. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting that an independent
judiciary provides a safeguard against arbitrary abuses of power by state or federal
governments). See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966) (com-
menting on the jury as a remarkable political institution); Linn, Changes in Trial by
Jury, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 3, 5 n.6 (1928) (jury stands as guardian of liberties).
20. Thomas Jefferson poignantly expressed the feeling of the time as follows:
"Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the legisla-
tive or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legisla-
tive. The execution of the laws is more important than the making of them." V. HANS
& N. VIDMAR, supra note 8, at 36.
21. The right to jury trial became official on March 1, 1792, when the first ten
amendments to the Constitution were finally ratified by three-fourths of the state leg-
islatures. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1171 (1971).
The seventh amendment provides as follows: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. See infra note 75 for a description of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial.
22. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (recognizing that juries
should be composed of a fair cross-section of the community); Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) (upholding state statute requiring juror selection based on
community esteem, integrity, and character); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
223-24 (1946) (excluding daily wage earners as jurors held discriminatory and not al-
lowed since they represent a large segment of the community).
23. The Supreme Court acknowledges that to effectively fulfill its function as an
instrument of justice, the jury must be representative of the community. See Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). It is unlikely that a fair representation of the commu-
nity can be obtained if qualified individuals are not obligated to serve when called. But
see State v. Puente, 69 Ohio St. 2d 136, 431 N.E.2d 987 (1982) (exclusion of doctors, den-
tists, and lawyers held not to violate fair cross-section requirement), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1109 (1982).
24. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 90 (1969). See also Carter, 396 U.S. at 332-33 (recogniz-
ing that jury service is a civic duty).
25. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 586, 31 S.E.2d 858, 862 (1944) (stating that jury
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state statute.26 Such a responsibility is logically necessary to insure
that jurors do indeed represent every walk of life. Jury service al-
lows citizens to actually participate in the judicial system, which in
turn teaches them the workings of our legal framework.27 Thus,
while jury duty is couched as an obligation, it also serves as an oppor-
tunity2 8 for all citizens to become involved in assuring that the gov-
ernment does not abuse its power.
Nevertheless, the opportunity to serve on a jury does not create an
inherent right to serve.29 Each state determines the qualifications
necessary in order to serve on a jury,30 and those citizens of the state
service is an obligation that the law imposes on all who meet the requirements). See
also Linn, supra note 19, at 10-11 (referring to the duties of jurors and performance of
jury responsibilities).
26. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1982). These statutes pertain to both grand and
petit juries in the federal courts. Section 1861 specifically indicates "[A]ll citizens shall
have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the dis-
trict courts ... and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that
purpose." The Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, approved by the American
Bar Association in 1972, makes essentially the same statement as section 1861 with re-
gard to jury service on state courts. UNIF. JURY SERV. & SELECT. ACT § 1, 13 U.L.A.
440 (1986). This Act has presently been adopted in eight states. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-71-101 to -122 (1973 & Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 612-1 to -26 (1985 & Supp.
1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 2-201 to -221 (1979 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-4-5.5-1 to
-22 (Burns 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1211-1257 (1980 & Supp. 1987); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 593.31 to 593.50 (West 1988); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-2 to -97 (Supp.
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-09.1-01 to -22 (1974 & Supp. 1987).
27. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922) (noting that jury service pro-
vides a unique learning opportunity by participating in the machinery of justice). See
also Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 150, 157 (1952) (jurors are
observed to see how the judicial process functions).
28. United States v. Edwards, 465 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that
equal protection might be denied if citizens were intentionally deprived of the opportu-
nity to serve).
29. Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 61, 524 P.2d 375, 379, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247,
251 (1974) (stating that an individual does not have a fundamental right to serve on a
jury); State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 661, 663 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 1011 (1966)
(confirming that an absolute right to serve on a jury does not exist).
30. Many of the qualifications are essentially the same for each state, but the stat-
utes are certainly not identical. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1986) (requiring good
character and sound judgment, United States citizenship, residency in county for at
least a year, attainment of age 19, and right to vote not lost by conviction for offense
involving moral turpitude); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, para. 2 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (requir-
ing attainment of age 18, habitation in town or precinct, fair character, freedom from
all legal exception, and ability to understand the English language); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 510 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (requiring United States citizenship, residency of county,
absence of mental or physical defects impairing ability to function, intelligence and
good character, and ability to read and write proficiently in the English language);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (Vernon 1988) (requiring attainment of age 18, state
and county citizenship, sound mind and good moral character, and ability to read and
who qualify are required to serve if called upon to do so. 31 Indeed,
courts may compel qualified individuals to serve unless undue finan-
cial hardship would result, 32 and contempt proceedings may be
brought against those who defy a court order to serve.3 3 The imposi-
tion of such a duty may be viewed as a rational requirement for en-
joyment of the many other rights that individuals possess as citizens
of the state.
While many jurors faithfully fulfill their commitments, though the
'task is not easily accomplished,3 4 others use a variety of excuses to
avoid the duty.3 5 Because jury service is an obligation owed by every-
one, a juror is not fully compensated for his efforts, nor does he enjoy
the right to compensation.3 6 Although many states have sought to al-
leviate the financial strain by providing nominal compensation for ju-
rors,3 7 some people feel the amounts provided are grossly inadequate
write); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070 (Supp. 1988) (requiring that juror be elector
and taxpayer of state, resident of county for more than one year, and of sound mind).
31. State ex rel. Passer v. County Bd., 171 Minn. 177, 179, 213 N.W. 545, 546 (1927);
Garrett v. Weinberg, 57 S.C. 127, 144, 31 S.E. 341, 344 (1898). These courts indicated
that qualified jurors must serve when called upon. See also 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 90
(1969).
32. The financial hardship exclusion will be invoked only if there is a strong like-
lihood that the financial embarrassment occasioned by serving will impose a significant
burden on the juror. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946). For example,
a blanket exclusion of all nonsalaried individuals would not be justified. Id.
33. Criminal contempt charges may be brought against a juror summoned for duty
who fails to show good cause for noncompliance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (1982). A fine
of $100 and imprisonment may be imposed. Id. See also UNIF. JURY SERV. & SELECT.
ACT § 16, 13 U.L.A. 464 (1970). But see United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612, 615
(D.D.C. 1943) (dismissing charges against juror who refused to serve on jury for reli-
gious reasons).
34. In the highly publicized and lengthy trial of John DeLorean, not one juror nor
even an alternate missed a day or arrived late although many had to travel over 100
miles to get to the courthouse. Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, AM. LAW., Dec.
1985, at 94.
35. One author, recounting his first call to jury duty, pondered whether he could
get an affidavit showing a pressing business need or ill health as excuses for not serv-
ing. He also considered friends who might know a judge or clerk who could relieve
him of duty. F. WELLMAN, GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: REMINISCENCES OF THIRTY
YEARS AT THE BAR 1 (1924).
36. Patierno v. State, 391 So. 2d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that ju-
ror compensation is a statutory right which a court may not alter); State v. Setzer, 42
N.C. App. 98, 256 S.E.2d 485 (1979) (noting that jury service is a responsibility, not a
form of employment).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.24 (West Supp. 1988) (allowing $10 per day for
active attendance in court plus 14c per mile traveling expense); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3049 (West Supp. 1988) (providing at least $12 per day but not more than $25 dol-
lars plus mileage compensation of at least 16c per mile); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.170
(Vernon Supp. 1988) (allowing $3 a day for reporting to court plus 7c per mile); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4561 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (allowing $9 a day for the first three
days, then $25 for each day thereafter, plus 17c a mile); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-18
(1987) (providing $14 a day plus 15c per mile); VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-195.1 (1986) (al-
lowing $20 a day and other necessary and reasonable costs as the court may
determine).
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and encourage people to find even more ways to avoid jury duty.38 A
corollary to this argument is that people may go to great lengths to
get onto the jury in a highly publicized case if the opportunity to re-
ceive substantial financial gain exists. Thus, juror journalism poses a
threat to the jury system if what has been traditionally considered a
civic obligation becomes just another profit-making device.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
A. The Juror's Freedom of Expression and the Doctrine
of Prior Restraint
Some commentators have indicated that legislation should be en-
acted to prohibit jurors from selling their accounts of court proceed-
ings. 39 However, any restrictions placed on a juror's ability to
publicly disclose his impressions could conflict with a juror's first
amendment right to freedom of expression. 40 "'Expression' includes
communication of information or ideas by speech, writing, art, or in
any other way." 41 The first amendment was included in the Consti-
tution primarily for two reasons: to prevent unchecked government
censorship and to put an end to the pernicious doctrine of seditious
libel.4 2 By guaranteeing the freedom of speech, the founding fathers
38. Recently, the California legislature cut juror compensation in half from ten
dollars to five dollars. Jurors and judges reacted sharply to the new law, believing it
will cause employers to be even less supportive of employees who get called to jury
duty. L.A. Daily J., July 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1. See also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 224 n.4 (1946) (citing House of Representatives report that compensation of
only $4 a day imposed extreme hardship when jurors serve for extended periods). In
1967, a task force was organized to study the problems facing criminal courts through-
out the country. See Task Force Report: The Courts, Task Force on Administration of
Justice, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice (1967). Regarding the treatment of jurors, the study found that the lack of ade-
quate compensation is one factor which has led to a negative perception of the judicial
system by the public. Id. at 90. Although the task force recognized that jury service is
a civic duty, it noted that the repeated intrusions into a juror's personal and business
life cannot be tolerated without reasonable compensation. Id at 91.
39. Jost, supra note 2, at 16, col. 4.
40. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
41. Emerson, Freedom of Expression, in THE FIRST FREEDOM TODAY 36 (1984)
[hereinafter Freedom of Expression].
42. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 833-34 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. In England, the king was considered to be
immune from criticism. Any publication openly demeaning either the king or his
agents was labeled seditious libel. Id. at 831. The doctrine was especially harsh since
provided for a marketplace of free ideas and individual self-
fulfillment.43
1. Emergence of the Prior Restraint Doctrine
The evils of unlimited government censorship power gave rise to
the doctrine of prior restraints, which was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota.44 The doctrine prohibits at-
tempts by the government to suppress speech before being communi-
cated or published.45 The English philosopher, John Stuart Mill,
hypothesized that two basic premises favor a policy of noninterfer-
ence with expression over a policy of censorship: free expression
tends to promote the spread of truth and society benefits as individu-
als become more independent and inquisitive.46 Two recognized
forms of prior restraint involve statutes seeking to prevent future
publication and judicial limitations, such as injunctions against future
expression, enforced through contempt procedures.47 These types of
restraints are disfavored by the courts.48
In Near, the State of Minnesota had enacted a statute prohibiting
the publication or circulation of a malicious, scandalous, or defama-
tory periodical of any kind.49 The Court examined the purpose and
effect of the statute to determine its validity. Finding that its object
was restraint, which was accomplished by enjoining publication, the
Court held the statute to be an invalid infringement of liberty.5 0 Cit-
ing Blackstone, the Court commented, "Every freeman has an un-
doubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to
forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press .... ,,51 Thus, Near
merely reinforced the old notion that unbridled censorship power, by
truth of the publication was not a defense. Id. See generally Levy, Liberty and the
First Amendment 1790-1800, 68 AM. HIST. REV. 22 (1962) for a historical analysis of the
doctrine of seditious libel.
43. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 42, at 836.
44. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
45. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648
(1955). The use of prior restraints arose in England when the printing rights were con-
trolled by the Crown. Id. at 650. Licensing acts were enacted prohibiting anyone from
printing any material without prior government approval. Id. See also CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 42, at 831.
46. See Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 519, 528-29 (1979).
47. Emerson, supra note 45, at 655-56.
48. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). These cases stand for the
proposition that a heavy presumption exists against the constitutional validity of prior
restraints.
49. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02.
50. Id. at 722-23.
51. Id. at 713-14.
[Vol. 16: 329, 1989] Juror Journalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
way of prior restraint, would not be tolerated in a free society.5 2
More recently, the Court grappled with the prior restraint problem
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.53 This case involved a court
order prohibiting the media from publishing or broadcasting the con-
tents of certain statements made by the defendant, who was accused
of murder. 54 The Court noted that the doctrine of prior restraint had
not previously been applied to criminal cases involving protective or-
ders, yet recognized that the doctrine should carry the same weight
in this setting as in any other.5 5 To determine if indeed the restric-
tive order was justified, the Court considered whether "the gravity of
the 'evil' . . . justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger."56
Applying this test, the Court found the order lacked support be-
cause it was not clear that the prior restraint would adequately pro-
tect the defendant's rights, especially since the crime was committed
in a small town of only 850 people where rumors were apt to travel
quickly.57 The Court concluded that "the guarantees of freedom of
expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances,
but the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption
against its use continues intact."5 8
Traditionally, the doctrine of prior restraint has been limited in its
application to those cases involving the media and the first amend-
ment right to freedom of the press. However, the doctrine may be
applied to a juror's right to free speech as well. In fact, in the juror
journalism context, the doctrine may be logically extended to encom-
pass free speech because of the close relationship of the jurors with
the press. Government restrictions on a juror's right to communicate
a story to the press should be considered as much an abridgement of
first amendment rights as would restrictions prohibiting the press
52. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 416 (1983).
53. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
54. Id. at 543-44.
55. Id. at 556, 559.
56. Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). This test has also been referred to as the "clear and present
danger" standard postulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
57. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976).
58. Id. at 570. In response to Stuart, the American Bar Association promulgated a
new standard prohibiting direct restraints on the media. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 8-3.1 commentary, at 8-31 (1986). The standard provides that the media may
not be punished for publishing information in its possession pertaining to criminal tri-
als. Id.
from publishing the juror's remarks. Such government action would
have the sort of "chilling effect" on expression that the first amend-
ment was designed to prevent.5 9
Therefore, legislation designed to prohibit jurors from selling their
personal accounts could be construed, as in Near, to be a constitution-
ally invalid prior restraint on speech. Similarly, injunctive orders is-
sued by a court prohibiting the sale of a juror's writings might also be
an invalid restraint.6 0 In either case, the state must show that the
gravity of harm threatened by the publication outweighs the intru-
sion of free speech rights. Such a showing may prove difficult once a
trial has concluded. Furthermore, the fact that courts are public in-
stitutions whose proceedings are open to the public strengthens the
notion that broad restrictions on speech in connection with trial pro-
ceedings are rarely justified.61
2. Balancing the Competing Interests
Although freedom of speech occupies a hallowed position in our so-
ciety, it is by no means an absolute right. 62 Consequently, it is sub-
ject to the balancing of individual rights against governmental
interests where conflicts exist.63 For example, one such government
interest is the fair administration of justice, which opponents of juror
journalism might argue will be adversely affected if jurors have the
unfettered discretion to sell their personal accounts of trial
proceedings.
Post-verdict interviews provide examples of how courts have at-
tempted to balance these competing interests. In the past, courts
have hesitated to allow post-verdict interviews with jurors to protect
them from needless harassment.6 4 The Supreme Court in early cases
viewed the interrogation of jurors as a "practice... replete with dan-
59. Freedom of Expression, supra note 41, at 36.
60. See Emerson, supra note 45, at 655-56.
61. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that be-
cause courts are public proceedings, other alternatives such as sequestering jurors or
changing venue should be considered to insure a fair trial rather than placing broad
restrictions on speech). See also infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
62. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (stating that even the Constitu-
tion does not protect some forms of speech). Several Supreme Court cases cite exam-
ples of unprotected speech: Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (heckling at a
private assembly); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939) (blocking streets to
distribute literature); and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (falsely
shouting fire in a theater to create a panic). See also Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) (advocating that first
amendment rights are not absolute). Contra Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245 (1961).
63. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 51. See also Freedom of Expression, supra note 41, at
37; McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1193-1203 (1959).
64. See Comment, Public Disclosures ofJury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886,
887 (1983).
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gerous consequences."65 However, this view eroded over the years as
courts began to recognize that a juror's freedom of speech would be
unnecessarily restricted by a complete prohibition of post-verdict in-
terviews by nonparticipants in the trial.66
The importance of this first amendment right was set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sherman.67 Sherman involved a
high publicity criminal trial of revolutionary organization members
devoted to overthrowing the government. Due to the tremendous
amount of media attention, the trial judge issued an order after the
verdict was rendered prohibiting the jurors from commenting on the
case to anyone and restricting the media from approaching or inter-
viewing the jurors.68
The appellate court reasoned, however, that a blanket order
prohibiting post-verdict contact with jurors did not have the same re-
medial effect as would an order issued before or during a trial. Since
a verdict had already been rendered, the defendants would in no way
be deprived of a fair trial. Furthermore, there was no indication that
the jurors would be subjected to unnecessary harassment if the me-
dia was allowed to contact them.69 Henceforth, the court felt there
were less restrictive alternatives for dealing with the fair trial and
harassment concerns. The court held that the orders be retracted
and that although the jurors were by no means compelled to speak
65. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915) (quoting Cluggage v. Swann, 4
Binm. 150, 155 (Pa. 1811).
66. Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have indicated that broad restrictive orders
prohibiting post-verdict interviews by the press are unenforceable. See, e.g., In re Ex-
press News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding district court rule prohibiting
juror interviews except by leave of court unconstitutional); United States v. Sherman,
581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding invalid an order prohibiting media from contact-
ing jurors after trial). In United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ind. 1982),
the evolution of the courts' views on the rights of the press and jurors is vividly de-
tailed. Citing cases from the Supreme Court as well as the Second, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits, the Franklin court traces the concerns expressed by these courts regarding
post-verdict interviews. Id. at 1139-41. Noting the recent outlook on first amendment
rights, however, the court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sherman to be
the more current standard. Id. at 1144. Consequently, the court ruled that it was a
juror's exclusive, private decision whether to speak with the press once the trial con-
cluded. Id. Thus, although a court may appropriately limit the locale of such activity,
it may not proscribe it altogether. Id. at 1145. See also Comment, The First Amend-
ment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 203 (1986) (discussing
the impact of In re Express News, Sherman, and Franklin upopi first amendment
rights).
67. 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 1360.
69. Id. at 1361.
with the media, they were free to do so if they wished.70
The conclusion to be drawn from Sherman and other similar cases
is that, after a trial, jurors will usually be allowed to speak liberally
with the press if they so desire. Since many courts now permit the
interviewing of jury members, jurors may logically assume that they
should not be prohibited from receiving compensation in return for
revealing their accounts of the trial proceedings to the press. How-
ever, jurors' rights are not always evaluated under the same stan-
dards as those of the general public.71 In promulgating its Standards
for Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association emphasizes that
in certain respects, jurors are agents of the state because they help to
administer justice.72 Thus, speech restrictions may be placed on ju-
rors which, if placed on the general public, would violate the first
amendment.7 3
On the other hand, when a juror sells his story to the media after a
verdict is rendered, the threat to justice is not as apparent as when a
juror sells his story before rendering a verdict.74 Additionally, once
jurors are released from service, they should no longer be considered
agents of the state, and thus should not be held to the same standard.
Consequently, any broad statutory or judicial prohibitions on a ju-
ror's right to sell his account of trial proceedings would likely be in-
valid as a prior restraint on free speech.
B. The Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
a fair trial by an impartial jury.7 5 Determining what constitutes an
70. Id. at 1362.
71. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.6 commentary, at 8-54 to -55 (1986).
72. Id. See also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1933) (suggesting that
jurors are officers of the court); 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982) (providing that jurors are
considered public officials for certain purposes).
73. See supra note 71. But cf Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
These cases held that first amendment rights were not improperly infringed upon by
statutes which prohibit state and federal employees from engaging in certain political
activities.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981)
(condemning the acquisition by defense counsel of literary rights to the client's story
prior to conclusion of the trial). The court clearly indicated that such conduct merited
disciplinary action. 466 F. Supp. at 1083; cf. Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1969), appeal filed sub nom. Wilson v. Lash, 457 F.2d 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 881 (1972) (owner of newspaper reporting events of trial was also defense counsel
who changed plea to insanity without consulting defendant); People v. Corona, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978) (defense counsel obtaining publication rights
held improper where counsel openly attempted to generate publicity and failed to pro-
vide adequate representation).
75. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
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impartial jury, however, has not been an easy task. Chief Justice
John Marshall believed a jury should render a verdict free from
"strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the testi-
mony that may be offered in opposition to them .... "76
Opponents of juror journalism are concerned that jurors might not
judge a case on its merits if given the opportunity to receive signifi-
cant financial benefit from jury service. These opponents contend,
that a juror's desire for a big story may possibly overcome the desire
to render justice.77
Arguably, the financial motives dominating the juror journalist
should be considered the sort of "strong and deep impressions" to
which Marshall alluded. On the other hand, most problems relating
to impartiality involve the juror's preconceived opinions or notions
which would lead to unreasonable prejudice.78 Some contend that
the opportunity of receiving compensation for a personal account of
trial proceedings will cause the juror to develop preformed opinions
which unduly prejudice the defendant. Nevertheless, courts recog-
nize that pretrial publicity generated by the media may have a signif-
icant impact on jurors.7 9 Similarly, the power of the media may
indirectly influence jurors when financial remuneration is offered for
a juror's story.8 0
1. Priority of the Sixth Amendment
It is safe to assume that as courts begin to address the juror jour-
nalism issue, they will likely be required to resolve the possible con-
flict between the juror's right to speak freely and the defendant's
right to an impartial jury. How the courts will reconcile this conflict
public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
77. One jury selection consultant remarked, "When you add the monetary incen-
tive [to serve as a juror], it just makes it that much harder to ascertain Whether people
are telling the truth or not." Jost, supra note 2, at 15, col. 4.
78. See Comment, Procedural Compromise and Contempt: Feasible Alternatives in
the Fair Trial Versus Free Press Controversy, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 650, 651-54 (1970).
79. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see also infra notes 100-103
and accompanying text.
80. See Comment, supra note 78, at 654-57 (suggesting powerful press may leave
lasting impressions on jurors).
is not entirely clear, although it seems they may be inclined to place
sixth amendment rights above first amendment rights.8 1
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,8 2 a lawyer's association
sought a declaratory judgment against enforcement of various "no
comment" rules imposed by statute and the American Bar Associa-
tion.8 3 The appellant argued that the rules prohibiting lawyers in-
volved in pending litigation from publicly commenting on the case
were an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights.
8 4
The court held that where there exists an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween a lawyer's first amendment right to make extrajudicial com-
ments about a trial and the defendant's sixth amendment rights, the
sixth amendment right must take precedence.8 5
The Bauer court indicated that although the "no comment" rules
could not be considered typical prior restraints, they must adhere to
the standards of "clearness, precision, and narrowness."8 6 Further-
more, in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the rules may
only proscribe those comments "that pose a 'serious and imminent
threat' of interference with the -fair administration of justice . ... 87
Thus, while the court acknowledged that some aspects of free speech
involving trial proceedings could be curtailed, it also emphasized that
a per se proscription would not be justified.88
The concern for protecting sixth amendment rights, as expressed
in Bauer, may cause courts to cautiously evaluate juror journalism.
If the courts determine that profit motives will affect a juror's impar-
tiality, it is likely they would be willing to impose necessary re-
straints in order to ensure a "fair administration of justice."
81. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating irreconcila-
ble conflict between public's first amendment right to trial access and defendant's
sixth amendment right to fair trial must be resolved in favor of the si~th amendment);
United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that the press and
public's first amendment right to access to criminal trials must give way to defendant's
superior right to a fair trial); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248
(7th Cir. 1975) (resolving conflicts between free speech and right to fair trial in favor
of the latter), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
82. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 247.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 248. Although the Constitution places no priorities on the various
amendments, the court's conclusion is reasonable given the fact that in a criminal trial
the defendant's life may be at stake. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (stating that "[n]o right ranks higher than the right of the ac-
cused to a fair trial"); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (indicating that a fair
trial is "the most fundamental of all freedoms").
86. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249. See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)
(stating that first amendment restrictions may not exceed the bounds necessary to pro-
tect governmental interests).
87. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249.
88. Id. at 250-51.
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2. The Right of the Public to be Informed
The sixth amendment does not guarantee the right to a trial com-
pletely free of public scrutiny and criticism.89 Courts acknowledge
that a defendant may waive his right to a public trial, yet still not en-
joy an absolute right to a private trial.90 The conflict between the
right to a fair trial and the right of the public to be informed of crim-
inal proceedings was exposed by the Court in Estes v. Texas.91 In Es-
tes, the public was alerted to the significance of the case by the access
given the press and media to the pretrial proceedings. Photogra-
phers, reporters, and radio broadcasters were stationed inside a booth
within the courtroom where live broadcasts were made constantly.92
The Court recognized that the media often provide invaluable serv-
ices by keeping the public informed of trial proceedings. At the same
time, however, it emphasized the need for adequate safeguards to
protect the defendant's rights. 93 Quoting Chief Justice Taft, the
Court stated:
[Tihe requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied
by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice
could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would
offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold
the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the
89. Several reasons are advanced for conducting criminal trials open to the public
view: (1) trial participants tend to fulfill their responsibilities more conscientiously; (2)
the general public becomes informed of developments in the law that may affect it;
and (3) increased respect and confidence in the judicial system is fostered when the
public is allowed to attend. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
See also United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 266 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1959).
"In general it appears to be sound public policy to avoid secret judicial proceedings in
the course of a trial so far as possible; it will promote confidence merely to avoid the
suspicions which always attend secrecy." Id. The distrust of secret trials probably re-
lates to the infringement of liberty occasioned by the Spanish Inquisition, English
Courts, and French Monarchy, all of which almost exclusively conducted trials hidden
from the public view. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948).
90. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). In Singer, the defendant
sought a bench trial in a federal criminal mail fraud case. Refusing the request, the
Court noted, "A defendant's only constitutional [sic] right concerning the method of
trial is to an impartial trial by jury." Id. at 36. In United States v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790, 791 (W.D. Pa. 1967), the defendants
sought to exclude the public from a hearing to suppress evidence. The court held that
even though the defendants had waived their right to a public trial, they were not enti-
tled to exclude the public from the hearings because the case involved an antitrust ac-
tion which should be open to the public view. Id. at 795.
91. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
92. Id. at 537.
93. Id. at 540.
latter due process of law.9 4
Proponents of juror journalism might argue that as long as a juror
upholds his oath to render a fair and impartial verdict, the defendant
is not harmed by the juror selling his story, especially after the trial
has concluded. This position may be valid; but as long as financial
gain from jury service presents even "a possible temptation to the av-
erage" juror, then juror journalism must be carefully scrutinized to
assure a fair trial for the defendant.
C. A Juror's Right to Privacy
In 1890, Professors Warren and Brandeis published their seminal
article entitled The Right to Privacy.95 This work laid the foundation
for the development of the privacy rights which are often spoken of
today.96 However, it was not until the landmark case of Griswold v.
Connecticut 97 that a constitutional right to privacy was recognized by
the Supreme Court. At that time, the right to privacy was estab-
lished as "a fundamental personal right, emanating 'from the totality
of the constitutional scheme under which we live.' "98
1. Development of a Juror's Right to Privacy
Courts have recognized that jurors are entitled to privacy but have
not set forth any parameters for protecting this right. 99 The
Supreme Court acknowledged a juror's right to privacy in the widely
94. Id. at 543 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). See also 3 STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-3.7 (1986) (duty of judge to see that jurors not ex-
posed to information which could preclude rendering of impartial verdict); cf. 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2349 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (indicating jurors' motives in ren-
dering verdict not grounds for setting verdict aside).
95. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
96. Until the nineteenth century, the notion of privacy was not of practical con-
cern to most people. D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 3 (1972). Because society
was basically agrarian, people were not forced to live in close proximity to each other
as they are today. However, as the economy evolved from primarily agricultural to in-
dustrial, many changes took place leaving a marked impact on society. Id. at 4-8. At
the same time, the American press experienced remarkable growth due to expanding
communication and transportation systems. It was under these circumstances that the
cry for privacy arose. Id. at 8-14.
97. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold involved a state statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptive devices or drugs by anyone. The Court held that the statute violated the
right to privacy which is specifically protected within the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 484-86.
98. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
99. Comment, Spotlight on the Jury: Trial Publicity and Juror Privacy, 6 COMM.
ENT. L.J. 469, 371-72 (1983-1984). A juror's right to privacy may be grounded in either
a constitutional or tort law basis. Id. at 379-80. Under the constitutional umbrella, the
juror would be protected from having personal matters publicly disclosed. Id. The tort
protection would be limited to preventing public disclosure of private facts. Id. at 380-
81.
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publicized case of Sheppard v. Maxwell.OO In that case, the Court
was appalled at the lack of privacy afforded the jurors. Throughout
the trial, jury members were continually subjected to the houndings
of photographers and reporters who, at one point, were stationed ad-
jacent to the jury room.101 When the jurors' pictures and addresses
were published in the newspaper, they were widely exposed to public
ridicule.102 The Court indicated that the extensive amount of public-
ity posed a serious threat to the jurors' privacy.103 Although not es-
tablishing any objective criteria for protecting the privacy of jurors,
the Court did indicate that trial judges must be aware of circum-
stances infringing upon a juror's right to privacy and take reasonable
steps to insure that judicial processes remain free from such prejudi-
cial outside influences. 0 4
Commentators have also suggested that prospective jurors have a
definitive right to privacy during the voir dire examination, 0 5 a right
which has been upheld by some courts. 0 6 Protecting prospective ju-
rors' right to privacy makes sense because these individuals are com-
mitting themselves to public sacrifice in serving on a jury, possibly
exposing themselves to further public scrutiny through the compre-
hensive and seemingly endless questions posited by the lawyers.o 7
Additionally, if prospective jurors' right to privacy is not respected
during voir dire, they may feel more constrained and less willing to
serve on juries.l0 8
These same compelling reasons which are advanced for protecting
a prospective juror's right to privacy during voir dire mandate an ex-
100. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
101. Id. at 355.
102. Id. at 353.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 353, 362-63.
105. See Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 708 (1982).
106. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 1979) (inquiry into prospec-
tive jurors' private concerns unnecessary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980). Some of
the private coricerns which may be protected include: educational background, United
States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977); views
about sex and obscenity, United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 314 (9th Cir. 1973),
aff'd, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); attitudes toward drug use or political activism, United States
v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 857 (1974); and
religious affiliation, Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956). But see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464: U.S. 501,
513-14 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (declining to recognize a prospective juror's
constitutional right to privacy).
107. See Comment, supra note 105, at 712.
108. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
tension of that protection for jurors who are actually called to serve.
Moreover, this right should extend to post-trial activities as well.
Some courts have already ruled accordingly by restricting the press's
right to conduct post-verdict interviews. In Haeberle v. Texas Inter-
national Airlines,1o9 the court stated that although the interests of
the press in conducting post-verdict interviews were substantial, they
were simply outweighed by the interests of jurors in their own
privacy.1' 0
2. Privacy in the Deliberation Room
Perhaps the most important aspect of juror privacy is that which
transpires in jury room deliberations. Although a juror certainly un-
derstands that comments made to other jurors during the delibera-
tion process are not given any privacy protection, it may be argued
that the juror does have an expectation of privacy in that same infor-
mation not being revealed to the general public."' Such an assump-
tion is reasonable, especially since jurors are often kept in seclusion
during high publicity trials and may even be admonished by the
judge to avoid exposure to extraneous information from the media or
other sources. 112
Efforts to avoid media exposure during trial proceedings tend to
create an aura of secrecy which envelops the jury throughout their
deliberations. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for jury members to
vow not to divulge comments made by individual jurors during delib-
erations after the trial's conclusion.113 Although these vows are
probably unenforceable and often broken, the fact they are made at
all underscores the importance jurors place on keeping the content of
their deliberations private."i 4
However, expectations of privacy usually diminish when a person
becomes associated with an event of intense public interest.il5 Some
courts hold that in such a situation, an individual's right of privacy is
not invaded when publicity is generated in connection with that
event.'1 6 Generally, because court proceedings are considered public
109. 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 1022.
111. Sharp, Post Verdict Interviews with Jurors, 88 CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1983,
at 3, 10. In United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (N.D. Ind. 1982), the
court suggested that jurors maintain a fundamental right to privacy as it pertains to
the contents of their deliberations and that post-verdict disclosure of these contents by
other jurors may invade the juror's rights.
112. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
113. For instance, the jurors in the DeLorean trial vowed not to reveal the com-
ments of individual jurors made during their deliberations. Several jurors later broke
this vow when talking with reporters. Brill, supra note 34, at 105.
114. See Sharp, supra note 111, at 10.
115. See generally W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
116. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (publishing legitimate
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events," 7 certain aspects of privacy rights may not be fully recog-
nized,1' 8 and privacy rights enjoyed by a juror may be inferior to
other important rights. 1 19 For example, it may be argued that the
public has a legitimate right to know what occurs during the deliber-
ation process. Allowing jurors to publish their accounts of the trial
proceedings may in fact remove some of the fear and uncertainty
often associated with serving on a jury. 2 0 Thus, even if jurors do en-
joy a right to privacy, this right must be balanced against the right of
the public to be informed of trial proceedings.' 2 '
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
In criminal trials, the judge plays a crucial role in assuring that the
trial is conducted fairly and in accordance with established judicial
procedures.122 In highly publicized trials, the judge must often take a
strong stand in order to maintain the integrity of the judicial process
as the media and public become more involved.123 For this reason,
the entire courthouse premises, including the courtroom, are under
the strict control of the court.' 24 Judges have wide latitude in gov-
erning the daily activities of the court and may prescribe whatever
measures reasonably necessary to prevent injustice. 25 In addition,
restrictions may be placed on jurors and others involved in the pro-
ceedings even if they limit first amendment rights.126
items of public interest does not invade right to privacy); Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948) (no invasion of privacy to publish
photograph of person involved in public event).
117. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (noting that trial is a public event).
118. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979). The court
determined that the Supreme Court's decisions concerning a right to privacy were lim-
ited in scope to matters of marriage and family relations. Id.
119. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984) (noting
that privacy rights of prospective jurors must be balanced against public rights to open-
ness of trial proceedings).
120. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 90.
122. See Sharp, supra note 111, at 14 (indicating that judges bear ultimate responsi-
bility to see that trials are conducted in a fair and civilized manner). See generally 1
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 6-1.1 (1986).
123. Sharp, supra note 111, at 14.
124. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966); Combined Communications
Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982).
125. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358; Finesilver, 672 F.2d at 821.
126. United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusal to grant
press access to exhibits was not abuse of discretion); Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d
The importance of allowing this judicial discretion was manifested
in Sheppard v. Maxwell.127 As a result of Sheppard, a committee was
formed to study the operation of the jury system and the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" issue.128 The study was conducted over a two-year
period and focused on problems which arose during the Sheppard
trial. The committee recommended that in highly publicized cases
the court be allowed to issue whatever orders might be appropriate to
maintain a fair trial and impartial jury.129
Some courts have gone even further by extending judicial discre-
tion into an affirmative duty. These courts maintain that in criminal
cases there exists a duty to shield the jury from the prejudicial ef-
fects resulting from extensive publicity.130 This duty does not end,
however, once a verdict is rendered; the judge has an additional duty
to protect the integrity of the verdict as well.13 1 If jurors are allowed
to publish their accounts of the deliberations, it is conceivable that
the defendant might find cause to impeach the verdict.
The veracity of evidence suggesting improper juror motives in ren-
dering the verdict would have to be verified by the court. The only
reliable way to accomplish this would be to require jurors to testify
regarding their process of arriving at the verdict. However, this pro-
cedure would violate the Federal Rules of Evidence provision which
prohibits juror testimony pertaining to the deliberation process. 132
One of the primary purposes of this rule is to promote finality of ver-
558, 561 (7th Cir. 1970) (acknowledging validity of rule prohibiting photographing or
broadcasting in certain areas of courthouse).
127. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 100-104.
128. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
129. Id. at 410. See also 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-3.7 (1986).
130. Central S.C. Chapter v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 566 F.2d
706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). See also Sharp, supra note 111, at
14.
131. Traditional standards of appellate review mandate that the jury's verdict be
accepted unless it is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. El-
lerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962). Thus, the trial judge must make a concerted
effort to insure as far as possible that the verdict is not clearly erroneous and thereby
not subject to attack. See Sharp, supra note 111, at 14.
132. The rule states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment ....
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (amended 1987). See also United States v. Miller, 806 F.2d 223, 225
(10th Cir.'1986) (refusing to question juror who indicated she had second thoughts
about her vote two weeks after defendant was convicted); United States Football
League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 842
F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding post-trial statements by jurors to the press concerning
their own understanding of the verdict's consequences not admissible to impeach
verdict).
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dicts and to foster respect for the jury as a fact-finding body.' 33
Echoing these sentiments, a Senate committee evaluating proposed
amendments to the rule commented: "Jurors will not be able to func-
tion effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial
litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system and the citi-
zens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit inquiry into the
internal deliberation of the jurors."'134 Therefore, the imposition of
post-verdict restrictions on a juror's freedom to sell his account
would seem justifiable if necessary to protect the verdict from attack.
B Secrecy of Juror Deliberations
The secrecy of the deliberation process has long been considered
fundamental to the judicial function as a whole. 135 At common law,
privacy of juror deliberations was an absolute requirement, 3 6 and ju-
rors were often sequestered and sheltered from all outside influ-
ences.137 Several states have recognized this common law rule and
now apply it in their own proceedings.138 Furthermore, many states,
by statute, have implicitly taken steps to ensure the privacy of juror
deliberations.13 9
133. See Feldman & Kerr, Post-trial Juror Interviews, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 449, 451-52
(1984). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 606[06], at 606-63-68 (1987).
134. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974).
135. See Comment, supra note 64, at 886.
136. See People v. Oliver, 196 Cal. App. 3d 423, 430, 241 Cal. Rptr. 804, 808 (1987).
Recounting the common law requirement, the court quoted Sir Edward Coke who
stated:
By the law of England a jury, after their evidence given upon the issue, ought
to be kept together in some convenient place, without meat or drinke, fire or
candle, which some bookes call an imprisonment, and without speech with
any, unlesse it be the bailiffe, and with him only if they be agreed.
Id.
137. J. BAKER, supra note 8, at 65-66.
138. See, e.g., California: People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 75, 40 P.2d 891 (1935)
(recognizing that jury is required to deliberate in private); Indiana: Rickard v. State, 74
Ind. 275 (1881) (jury retiring from court presence to engage in private and confidential
discussion); Michigan: People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879) (finding that
jury must have opportunity for private and confidential discussion); New York: Gib-
bons v. Van Alstyne, 9 N.Y.S. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (error for jury room door to be open
during deliberations with judge entering room and several others standing near open
door).
139. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1128 (West 1985) (officer must keep jury together
during deliberations in a private and convenient place and not allow anyone to commu-
nicate with them); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.120b (West 1981) (misdemeanor for
anyone to attempt to record deliberations of jury in any case); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 310.10 (McKinney 1982) (jury must deliberate outside courtroom under supervision
of court officer who may not communicate with jurors or permit any other person to
do so); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.03 (Baldwin 1981) (jury must be kept together
The interest in preserving this privacy is shared by both the gov-
ernment and the public.140 Public disclosure of jury deliberations
threatens the very foundation of the jury system. Perhaps Justice
Cardozo best summarized the nature of the problem: "Freedom of de-
bate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."141 Confidentiality in this setting provides a
shield against extrajudicial influences which tend to weaken the de-
liberation process and thus the rendering of a fair verdict. i 42
1. Judicial and Legislative Concerns
Courts have yet to face the problems juror journalism may pose to
maintaining the secrecy of the deliberation process, but they have ad-
dressed and increasingly recognized the importance of this secrecy.
Recently, in Tanner v. United States,i 43 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the long-held position that any post-verdict examination of a
juror's conduct during deliberations seriously weakens the judicial
process. The Court stated that "[F]ull and frank discussion in the
jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay-
people would all be undermined by a barrage of post verdict scrutiny
of juror conduct."144
The legislature has joined the courts in expressing concern regard-
ing the disclosure of jury deliberations. In the early 1950's, the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School conducted a research study to evaluate
the continued viability of the jury system.1 45 One aspect of the pro-
ject required recording the deliberations of juries in six different tri-
als. Upon learning of the project, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary conducted a hearing to discuss the impact that recording of
jury deliberations would have on the integrity of the jury system.1 46
Although the hearing's results were inconclusive, they highlighted
under charge of officer until they agree on verdict-may temporarily separate only for
meals and sleep); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.300 (1962) (jury must be kept together
under charge of officer who shall keep jury separate from other people and shall not
communicate to any person the state of their deliberations).
140. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (compelling
government interests require privacy of deliberations); Rakes v. United States, 169
F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir.) (indicating public duty to report attempts to bring outside
influence into jury room), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948).
141. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
142. See Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1211; see also Comment, supra note 64, at 888-92.
143. 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).
144. Id.1at 2748.
145. See Recording of Jury Deliberations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investi-
gate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) [hereinafter Record-
ing Hearings].
146. Id.
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the concerns expressed regarding the privacy of deliberations. Not
surprisingly, many groups were vehemently opposed to the practice
of recording deliberations.147
Public disclosure of jury deliberations through juror journalism in-
vites the same harmful degradation to the integrity of the jury sys-
tem as do court-made recordings of the deliberations. In both cases, a
permanent record is established which intrudes into and exposes a
juror's thought processes. 148 Indeed, juror-made recordings may even
be more damaging because they comprise only a subjective analysis
made by one juror, whereas court-made recordings provide an objec-
tive evaluation of all the jurors. Additionally, any fabrications cre-
ated to embellish a juror's story would remain unopposed if the story
is permitted to be exposed through juror journalism.
2. Impairment of a Juror's Freedom of Action
A more significant threat to the secrecy of the deliberation process
arises if a juror contracts to sell his account before conclusion of the
trial. Such a scenario is similar to cases where a juror is offered a
bribe to render a certain verdict.149 Although a financial offer from
the press may not require or even mention a specific outcome of the
trial, the lure of big money may be enough to materially affect that
147. Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, Patrick Murphy
Malin, made the following statement regarding the recording of jury deliberations:
Everybody concerned in a case should have the firm assurance that the jury is
.as impartial as humanly possible-as free as scrupulous observance of rules
can make it from any kind of surveillance, embarrassment, or coercion. This
is gravely threatened.., if jury room proceedings are later revealed to anyone
even a scientist impassionately studying human behavior.... Any destruction
of the privacy of jury deliberations is bad, even in the form of a juror's com-
ments after the verdict is rendered.
Recording Hearings, supra note 145, at 189. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982) (imposing
criminal sanctions for recording, observing, or listening to deliberation proceedings).
148. United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 1100, 1106-07 n.12 (5th Cir.) (citing several
cases which note a reluctance to probe the jurors' minds), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965
(1979). See also supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956). In Remmer, an out-
sider approached a juror and informed him that he could probably make a nice profit
if he worked a deal with the defendant. Id. at 380. The juror later commented that he
was disturbed and distressed by this conversation. Id. Finding that this encounter
might have unduly influenced the juror's decision-making process, the Court held that
the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 382. Federal law now provides that a
juror who solicits or accepts a bribe may be imprisoned up to fifteen years or fined up
to $20,000. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-607 (1986) (juror receiv-
ing bribe guilty of class IV felony); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1347 (West 1981)
(juror accepting bribe to render verdict liable for actual damages to aggrieved party
plus ten times amount of bribe in addition to possible criminal punishment).
juror's "freedom of action."150 The law will not tolerate unauthor-
ized, extraneous intrusions which may influence, even if indirectly, a
juror's decision-making process.151
In People v. Oliver,5 2 the California Court of Appeal underscored
the importance of this concept, emphasizing that implicit in the right
to trial by an impartial jury is "the right to have the jury's delibera-
tions conducted privately and in secret, free from all outside intru-
sions, and extraneous influences or intimidations." 153 The Oliver
court confronted the issue of whether a court reporter's presence in
the jury room during deliberations constituted reversible error.
In Oliver, the jurors requested to rehear the testimony of both par-
ties. Complying with the request, the judge allowed the court re-
porter to enter the jury room and read the testimony from beginning
to end. However, the judge forbade the reporter to answer any ques-
tions from the jury. After the reporter had been in the jury room -for
three hours, the defense counsel became concerned because the de-
fendant's testimony during trial lasted only eighty minutes.154
The reporter later testified that although she did not answer any
questions, she did pause at the jurors' request to allow them to dis-
cuss various aspects of the testimony. While not participating in
these discussions, the reporter did hear some of the jury's delibera-
tions. 5 5 The court concluded that inherent in the right to an impar-
tial jury is the assurance that jury deliberations will be conducted in
privacy. Nevertheless, because the mere presence of the reporter did
not unduly prejudice the defendant, the court held that reversible er-
ror was not committed.15 6
The dicta in Oliver emphasizes the general concern that courts
have placed in assuring the privacy of jury deliberations. This con-
cern will likely be a focal point in determining the permissibility of
juror journalism. If secrecy of deliberations cannot be maintained,
those who feel the jury system needs refining will have yet another
argument favoring their proposition that the current jury system has
outlived its usefulness.157 Therefore, opponents of juror journalism
150. Remmer, 350 U.S. at 381. See also supra text accompanying note 94.
151. Remmer, 350 U.S. at 382.
152. 196 Cal. App. 3d 423, 241 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1987).
153. Id. at 428, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
154. Id. at 426, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
155. Id. at 426-27, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
156. Id at 435, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
157. Criticism over the value of the jury system has been continuously strong. One
exasperated critic remarked:
Too long has the effete and sterile jury system been permitted to tug at the
throat of the nation's judiciary as it sinks under the smothering deluge of the
obloquy of those it was designed to serve. Too long has ignorance been per-
mitted to sit ensconced in the places of judicial administration where knowl-
edge is so sorely needed. Too long has the lament of the Shakespearean
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would advocate that if for no other reason, this practice should not be
allowed because it destroys the secrecy of the deliberation process-
the part of the jury function which is critical for its continued
success.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts clearly mandate that the public has a right to know the
details of the proceedings in a criminal trial. It may even be argued
that a juror who sits on a case has a right to reveal information con-
cerning the trial to the press in exchange for compensation. Never-
theless, such a right must be evaluated in light of its effect on other
rights such as a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial by an impar-
tial jury and the juror's right to privacy. Because the courts have
gone to great lengths to protect these rights, they cannot be summa-
rily set aside in favor of a juror's right to free speech. Furthermore,
the danger to our jury system imposed by juror journalism far out-
weighs any benefits it provides.
Jury service is an important civic obligation owed by every citizen.
Allowing profit motives to replace this duty will tarnish the respect
and dignity that has been accorded the jury system for centuries.
The juror's responsibility is to solemnly administer justice, not to en-
rich himself at the expense of the defendant and other jurors. Con-
sequently, juror journalism should be prohibited, or at least narrowly
restricted, to preserve the sanctity of the criminal justice system-
one of the hallmarks of our free society.
BRENT K. ASHBY
character been echoed, "Justice has fled to brutish beasts and men have lost
their reason."
Sebille, Trial by Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A. J. 53, 55 (1924). See gener-
ally Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions, 21 U. CH. L. REV. 386
(1954) for an excellent discussion and analysis of the functions of the jury and its in-
ability to fulfill the expectations that have been placed on it as a judiciary device. Con-
tra H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 19 at 498 (providing a comprehensive empirical
study of the American jury system which concludes that the jury comprises a unique
arrangement of checks and balances to impressively infuse within our legal system the
notable attributes of equity and flexibility). Much of the criticism being thrust upon
the jury system, however, has been aimed at its use in civil trials. See, e.g., Green, Ju-
ries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152
(1962); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
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